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Abstract 
The symptoms of psychiatric illness are diverse, as are 
the causes of the conditions that cause them. Yet, 
regardless of the heterogeneity of cause and 
presentation, a great deal of symptoms can be explained 
by the failure of a single perceptual function – the 
reprocessing of ecological perception. 
It is a central tenet of the ecological theory of 
perception that we perceive opportunities to act. It has 
also been found that perception automatically causes 
actions and thoughts to occur unless this primary action 
pathway is inhibited. Inhibition allows perceptions to be 
reprocessed into more appropriate alter-native actions 
and thoughts. Reprocessing of this kind takes place over 
the entire frontal lobe and it renders action optional. 
Choice about what action to take (if any) is the basis for 
the feeling of autonomy and ultimately for the sense-of-
self. When thoughts and actions occur automatically 
(without choice) they appear to originate outside of the 
self, thereby providing prima facie evidence for some of 
the bizarre delusions that define schizophrenia such as 
delusional misidentification, delusions of control and 
Cotard’s delusion. 
Automatic actions and thoughts are triggered by 
residual stimulation whenever reprocessing is 
insufficient to balance automatic excitatory cues (for 
whatever reason). These may not be noticed if they are 
neutral and therefore unimportant or where actions and 
thoughts have a positive bias and are desirable. 
Responses to negative stimulus, on the other hand, are 
always unwelcome, because the actions that are 
triggered will carry the negative bias. 
Automatic thoughts may include spontaneous 
positive feelings of love and joy, but automatic negative 
thoughts and visualisations are experienced as 
hallucinations. Not only do these feel like they emerge 
from elsewhere but they carry a negative bias (they are 
most commonly critical, rude and are irrationally 
paranoid). 
Automatic positive actions may include laughter 
and smiling and these are welcome. Automatic 
behaviours that carry a negative bias, however, are 
unwelcome and like hallucinations, occur without a 
sense of choice. These include crying, stereotypies, 
perseveration, ataxia, utilization and imitation behaviours 
and catatonia. 
Introduction	  
Psychiatric illness may strike anywhere and in any 
demo-graphic. And even though some syndromes are 
somewhat treat-able, they are often utterly debilitating. 
For generations researchers and clinicians have been 
attempting to grapple with these syndromes. The effort 
is impressive, and with more than 7000 peer-reviewed 
articles for schizophrenia alone being published per year 
[1], there is no shortage of high quality empirical data. 
But like the data, most hypotheses relate to a small 
aspect of a single syndrome – a single symptom 
perhaps. Very few hypotheses or studies look broadly at 
psychiatric disorders, despite the murky boundaries 
between the syndromes and the reoccurrence of 
common symptoms in diverse conditions. Take imitation 
behaviour for instance. This is common in conditions as 
diverse as biological lesions, schizophrenia, and 
Alzheimer’s disease [2,3].  
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Psychotic	  disorders:	  the	  effect	  of	  
unmoderated	  ecological	  perception	  
Ecological	  perception	  
Until mirror neurons were first explained using the 
ecological theory of perception [4,5], the theory had no 
traction at all in neuroscience or medicine, even though 
the theory has robust sup-port and is relatively well 
accepted in the field of perceptual psychology [6]. But 
mirror neuron theory remains a relatively isolated 
curiosity in medicine, where naïve belief in serial and 
qualia oriented perception still dominates. As long as 
this belief is maintained, it is hard to imagine that the 
Descartian divide be-tween the studies of ‘mental’ 
psychotic states and ‘physical’ stereotypies will be 
bridged or that the overlap of symptoms of psychiatric 
illness will ever be understood holistically. 
The ecological theory claims that perception is 
action [4]. A per-son does not just interpret sense-data 
(qualia) to compile an array of conclusions – the senses 
work holistically to excite or inhibit the actions and 
thoughts that we find ourselves continually engaged 
with. A ‘delicious’ smell is delicious because it invites 
eating. A smell is repulsive when, prior to any 
subsequent rationalisation, an impulse to retreat is 
triggered. A chair is not a composite of visual and tactile 
information; it is foremost an opportunity to sit, the colour 
and shape of the chair may never even register. 
Evolutionarily advanced animals are able to 
moderate action/ thought perceptions with ‘self-control,’ 
a secondary process that al-lows a person to moderate 
(accept or transform) perception/action. The ability to 
choose how we react forms the basis for autonomy (as 
much as there is such a thing) [7]. Simple creatures 
have no such discretion. For them perception does not 
suggest nor demand behaviour, it is indistinguishable 
from behaviour. A frog has no choice but to eat a moving 
object of a certain size, and a barnacle has no choice 
but to stick to a hard surface, at which point it begins to 
consume its own brain [6]. 
Just as a cue for action is automatic, so too is 
self-control, at least for animals that have a frontal lobe 
which is developed enough to enable self-control [6]. In 
healthy adults, the force of self-control opposes 
undesirable automatic behaviour with an equal opposite. 
In most cases, reprocessing is so well balanced that 
people will not realize when they have ‘acted’ or 
‘behaved’ (refrained from action). People sometimes 
notice after the fact: for example when they have just 
swallowed the strawberry that was meant to decorate a 
cake. People may also recognize the impulse ‘telling’ 
them to jump when they reach a cliff’s edge, but equally 
so, they recognize the impulse to self-control: the recoil 
of alarm at the thought of plummeting of a cliff, or the 
guilty thought: ‘I couldn’t resist,’ regarding the strawberry 
for the cake. As Gibson points out, the ecological theory 
makes sense of impulses triggered by perception: ‘‘Fruit 
says ‘eat me’’’ [4]. And a cliff says ‘‘jump!’’ 
 
An	  ecological	  hypothesis	  for	  the	  symptoms	  of	  psychiatric	  
disorders	  
Because the laws of physics govern action, they should 
also govern ecological perception because perception is 
active. Newton’s third law is particularly pertinent in this 
instance; to discharge an action/perception, an equal 
and opposite self-control/reaction is required. Perception 
always triggers action, although those actions may be 
transformed into alternative responses. Self-control can 
transform inappropriate action/perception impulses into 
alter-native thoughts, feelings, desires or actions, just as 
energy can be transformed.  
Stimulus may be desirable (positive), neutral or 
undesirable (negative). And untransformed actions 
should reflect these qualities. A raucous positive action 
may be permissible in specific con-texts (a party for 
instance). It may be tempered to meet a social milieu, 
but the reprocessing of a positive stimulus need only be 
partial. Likewise for neutral stimulus. Action resulting 
from positive or neutral stimulation will rarely be harmful 
and unwanted. Negative stimulus, on the other hand, 
needs complete transformation, lest unwanted, 
unintended and unmoderated actions and thoughts 
occur. Although organic brain damage (particularly to the 
frontal lobe) may prevent reprocessing [2,8,9], a 
Bayesian function moderated by the dopamine system 
[10] also appears to be in place to restrict autonomous 
action in emergencies [11], allowing automatic behaviour 
free reign [12]. Because automatic processes are fast 
and accurate, the evolutionary purpose for this bypass 
function is presumably to allow much faster fight and 
flight instincts when needed [13].  
Unmoderated reactivity is definitively automatic, 
regardless of whether a patient is aware of their 
behaviour or not. Because all unmoderated actions 
originate outside of the autonomous domain, they will 
appear to originate elsewhere. If primarily physical, 
unmoderated reactivity will present as stereotyped 
behaviours. Unmoderated thoughts are experienced as 
hallucinations when thoughts (internal voices) and 
visualisations (imagery) are experienced without the 
context of autonomy. The experience of continual 
automaticity will erode a sense of self, because actions 
are genuinely not autonomous. The primary exceptions 
being cases of severe frontal damage, where the sense 
of self cannot exist at all [14,15], but neither can choice 
[8]. Aside from these extreme situations, many of the 
bizarre beliefs and experiences that are common among 
psychiatric patients and characterise schizophrenia are 
related to the loss of autonomy of thought and action. 
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(See Table 1). 
When automatic reactions are predominantly 
physical, they will be classed as catatonic (DSM-IV 295 
20). When excess automaticity primarily causes 
misidentification of action and thought, the paranoid 
classification is most appropriate (DSM-IV 295 30). If 
automatic behaviours interfere with normal trajectories of 
reason or behaviour, a disorganised classification (DSM-
IV 295 10) will be applied. If perceptual reprocessing is 
overly applied to positive stimulus, schizoaffective 
disorder and affective flattening may be the diagnosis 
(DSM-IV 295 70). Thus, one solution ad-dresses all the 
primary symptoms of psychiatric disorders. 
Evidence	  
Reprocessing of action/perception is thought to occur 
over the entire frontal lobe of the brain. This area is 
subject to decreased connectivity in schizophrenia, [11] 
and is also the primary site for the processing of 
creativity, choice [16] and the sense-of-self [14,15]. The 
function of the frontal lobe in reprocessing of information 
is evident because whenever there is frontal damage, 
some degree of unusual automatic behaviour is 
ubiquitous. A study of fontal lesions showed that 100% 
of patients (n = 29) eventually eventuated in imitation 
behaviour or a more severe disorder involving loss of 
autonomy. (at the time the study was conducted, there 
was one exception (4%, n =1), whom presented with 
head-aches. This patient developed imitation behaviour 
shortly after the study period.) [2]. 
The reprocessing of negative stimulus was 
imaged by Northoff et al. [17]. In this study, akinetic 
catatonic patients (DSM-IV 295 20, n = 3; bipolar 1 
DSM-IV 296 54c, n = 7), psychiatric patients (paranoid 
schizophrenia DSM-IV 295 30, n = 3; bipolar 1 DSM-IV 
296 54, n = 7) and healthy controls (n = 10) where 
exposed to emotionally positive, neutral and negative 
stimulus in the form of pic-tures (from the International 
Affective Picture System) while undergoing fMRI scans 
of their entire frontal lobes. For positive and neutral 
stimulus, all subjects showed processing imbalances 
(eccentricity) where excitation (+) exceeded inhibitory 
reprocessing (-) (see Fig. 1). For negative stimulus, 
however, only the psychiatric cohorts showed any 
eccentricity (see Fig. 2). They were unable to balance 
the negative impact of the stimulus over the areas the 
frontal lobe (the orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, medial 
prefrontal, lateral prefrontal, premotor and motor 
cortices). In contrast, healthy controls did this nearly 
perfectly (variation = 0 63% n = 21, p = 0 05) (Figs. 1 
and 2). All cases of eccentricity are speculated to relate 
to automatic behaviours, but this does require further 
testing using experiments based on the model 
developed by Northoff et al. [17]. At this stage it is 
difficult to monitor hallucinatory or delusionary thought, 
but in further experiments, care should be taken to 
monitor for physical tics and mannerisms to see just how 
much they correlate with the neuronal eccentricity. 
 
Conclusions	  and	  predictions	  
This hypothesis explains a broad spectrum of 
symptoms, from hallucinations and delusions to 
disorganisation and catatonia; wherever the symptoms 
present – whether they occur in organic lesions, onset 
dementias or in psychotic illnesses. 
It appears that any dysfunction within the frontal 
cortex (regardless of specific region) will cause 
automatic and unintended action (imitation behaviour or 
a more severe disorder also involving the loss of 
autonomy). But the frontal cortex must still be largely 
functional for these automatic actions to be experienced 
as hallucinations or lead to delusions. Without a 
functional frontal cortex it is unlikely that self-reflection 
can occur at all, although this doesn’t mean that 
automatic expressions of happiness and sadness are 
disingenuous. On the contrary; insincerity is one of the 
inhibitory functions that will be debilitated. The 
declarative experiences of patients are likely to be more 
genuine than those of healthy individuals who are better 
equipped to voluntarily moderate their behaviour and 
take ownership of it. In many ways this explains some of 
the most vexing questions about psychotic behaviour. 
When patients blame others for making the world a bad 
place, their delusions are very genuine. And a 
diminished sense of self may easily present as total 
moral disinterest, and when ac-tions are unpredictably 
automatic, the results may be very nasty indeed [18]. 
 
Not only does this hypothesis predict much of the 
bizarre experience and behaviour associated with 
psychotic illness, it also predicts a measurable 
neurological correlate. If inhibitory processes in the 
frontal lobe are insufficient to balance excitatory 
impulses, it would follow that the primary inhibitory 
neurotransmitter within the frontal lobe (gamma-
Amniobutyric acid – GABA) will reflect this with 
moderate down-regulation, moderate, because only 
negative impulses are properly balanced in healthy 
adults and positive impulses are inordinately inhibited in 
severe psychotic conditions. Current evidence seems to 
point this way, but has hitherto remained unexplained 
[19]. 
It is hoped that this hypothesis will allow scientists 
and doctors to understand some of their science in a 
more human way. To understand that an excited neuron 
has a corollary action, and that the Newtonian laws even 
apply to the minds we live in. 
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Table 1  
Most of the symptoms and signs listed in the DSM-IV for schizophrenia and related disorders can be explained using 
the ecological perception model.  
Symptom Explanation 
  
Delusions  
Delusions of control, thought insertion delusions and other misattribution Automatic (non-autonomous) actions, esp. when experienced alongside 
delusions hallucinations 
Grandiose delusions Hallucinations with positive bias 
Paranoid delusions Perception with negative bias due to improperly reprocessed negative stimulus (see 
 figures)  
Somatic delusions 
 
Hallucinations  
Voices  
Visual hallucinations  
Disorganised speech  
Disorganised thought, derailment, tangentality, communication difficulties, 
alogia  
Grossly disorganised behaviour  
Disorganised behaviour, attention deficits, agitation, stereotypy, 
perseveration, behavioural monitoring peculiarities, agitation, 
inappropriateness, silliness  
Negative signs  
Affective flattening 
 
 
Negativity  
Catatonic symptoms  
Catatonia and other deficit signs 
 
Delusions associated with automatic (non-autonomous) body functions and 
hallucinated experience 
 
Automatic (non-autonomous) thoughts, esp. ones with negative bias  
Automatic (non-autonomous) visualisation, esp. images with negative bias 
 
Automatic thoughts interfere with normal sequence of logic and narrative structure 
 
 
Automatic actions and thoughts interfere with normal sequence of behaviour 
 
 
 
Attempts to reprocess negative stimulus indiscriminately causes flattening. Some positive 
automaticity is lost with the negative. (See the reduced positive reactivity in Fig. 2) 
 
Incomplete negative reprocessing causes negative bias 
 
Evidence demonstrates that these symptoms are caused by greater affective impact of 
action/perception alongside a strong reprocessing eccentricity. See figures [17] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overall eccentricity caused by all stimulus. Note 
the inversion in responses. Where healthy people are 
able to attenuate negative stimulus and are able to 
‘express’ positive responses, the opposite is true for both 
psychiatric cohorts. The overall impact of exposure to 
negative stimulus (from the International Affective 
Picture System) measured by activation (+) and inhibiton 
of neurons ( ) through-out the frontal lobe. Numbers 
represent the sum activity of orbitofrontal, anterior 
cingulate, medial prefrontal, lateral prefrontal, premotor 
and motor cortices. Grey areas show the extent of 
deviation from equanimity. (Based on Northoff et al. 
[17]). C: Cataleptic (DSM-IV 295 20, n = 3; bipolar 1 
DSM-IV 296 54c, n = 7), P: Psychiatric (Paranoid 
schizophrenia DSM-IV 295.30, n = 3; bipolar 1 DSM-IV 
296 54, n = 7), H: Healthy controls, n = 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overall impact and excitatory eccentricity 
(deviation from balance) caused by negative stimulus. 
C: Cataleptic (DSM-IV 295 20, n = 3; bipolar 1 DSM-IV 
296 54c, n = 7), P: Psychiatric (Paranoid schizophrenia 
DSM-IV 295.30, n = 3; bipolar 1 DSM-IV 296 54, n = 7), 
H: Healthy controls, n = 10. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary data 
 
Supplementary data associated with this article can 
be found, in the online version, at 
doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2011.09.029. 
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